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Abstract A theory of the evolution of mind cannot be complete without an
explanation of how cognition became representational. Artificial approximations of
cognitive evolution do not, in general, produce representational cognition. We take
this as an indication that there is a gap in our understanding of what drives evolution
towards representational solutions, and propose a theory to fill this gap. We suggest
selection for learning and selection for second order learning as the causal factors
driving the emergence of innate and acquired forms of representation, respectively.
Cognition is commonly viewed as a ‘‘black box’’—selection works on externally
visible behaviour alone, with little regard for implementation structure. Yet even if
implementation structure is not constrained by selection on behaviour, imple-
mentation structure does affect how easy or difficult it is to make specific mod-
ifications to the behaviour. Hence selection for learning can affect the
implementation structure of behaviour. Similarly, the implementation structure of
learning ability itself is not under direct selection, but selection for second order
learning can affect the implementation structure of first order learning. We argue
that these indirect selection effects guide evolution towards representational
implementations, as structural alignment between implementation structure and
environment structure guarantees that simple changes in the environment can be met
with simple changes in implementation. We illustrate the theory with examples of
computational investigations, and discuss how the theory may help put repre-
sentational cognition within reach of purely connectionist AI.
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Introduction
Representation is one of the fundaments of advanced cognition. A theory of the
evolution of mind cannot be complete without an explanation of how cognition
became representational. However, a clear explanation seems to be missing. The
issue is at the core of a long-running debate in AI. Proponents of a strongly
representational view of mind have long criticized connectionist AI for its inability
to account for the representational qualities of mind (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988;
Fodor and McLaughlin 1990; McLaughlin 2009). The root of this inability lies in
the fact that connectionists typically use an automated adaptation process (evolution
or learning) to structure their AI systems (e.g. simulated evolution of a neural
network), and somehow our approximations of natural adaptation processes do not
seem inclined toward representational solutions.
If we believe that mind is representational, and that it is the product of adaptation
processes, then why don’t our approximations of adaptation processes produce
representational solutions? While this issue has gained prominence in AI and
philosophy of AI, its relevance is by no means restricted to these fields. If evolution
as we understand and model it does not produce representational cognition, then we
are failing to understand something quite crucial about the origins of our own
minds.
Correspondence and Representation
Representation is a vague term used by many different authors to denote many
different things. We will not theorize much on the specifics of representation. Our
focus is on its most basic fundaments, and under what sort of evolutionary
conditions those may emerge.
At its most basic, we take representation to involve correspondence relations
between elements of a cognitive system and elements of the task or environment it
operates in (Spencer 1885, see also Godfrey-Smith 1996, 2002). We use the term
correspondence here for the extent to which we can point to individual parts of a
cognitive system and say what they are for, or what they stand for, or even what
they mean. If for example some part (say a nerve cell) of a system selectively
responds to vertical lines and another part selectively responds to horizontal lines,
then we can point at these parts and say ‘‘this part handles vertical lines and that part
handles horizontal lines’’. Or, when a system’s operation involves the manipulation
of linguistic expressions, then we can (at least in principle) isolate parts (words) and
identify the environmental elements they stand for (whether this is sufficient for
those parts to have meaning is a different question, that we will not concern
ourselves with here). In such cases we say there are specific correspondence
relations between the cognitive system and its environment (one-to-one correspon-
dence). On the other hand if each individual part of the system is involved in
handling many elements of the environment, and each individual element of the
environment is handled by many parts of the cognitive system, then we cannot
easily say what a given element is for, or say for a given part of the task or
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environment which part of the cognitive system handles it. A visual system may
work without any specific parts specialising on vertical or horizontal line
orientations. In this case we have fuzzy correspondence between cognitive system
and environment (many-to-many correspondence). Hand-coded AI systems usually
feature highly specific correspondence, and theories about the nature of represen-
tation usually assume highly specific correspondence. Even when theorists disagree
about the format of representations (e.g. whether they are pictorial or linguistic),
they still share the basic intuition that representations are informational structures
that consist of parts specifically corresponding to parts of the external world. As
such, correspondence is more fundamental than the issue of representational format.
It is on this issue of correspondence that we focus our attention.
Connectionist systems violate our intuitions about representation at this
fundamental level. They are usually created using approximations of the adaptation
processes that produced natural cognition (learning or evolution), but despite
handling a variety of impressively complex tasks, they usually show very fuzzy
correspondence only. This poses a bit of a paradox. Maybe it means the intuition
that correspondence is important to cognition is just wrong? Some have indeed
defended such positions (e.g. Brooks 1991). We think that conclusion is premature.
There are still many tasks that connectionist systems struggle with, that hand-coded
classical AI solves with ease by employing explicit and specific correspondence (in
particular tasks that involve syntactic or similarly rule-based manipulations). So
then maybe the problem is not in our intuition but in connectionism, for failing to
account for correspondence. It has indeed been argued that connectionism just does
not have much to contribute to the study of representational cognition (Fodor and
Pylyshyn 1988). We think this conclusion, too, is premature.
We argue that the dearth of specific correspondence in connectionist systems
undermines neither the importance of correspondence, nor the connectionist
paradigm. We explain the paradox as follows: The reason representational cognition
emerges in natural species but not artificial species is that the natural world selects
for representational abilities, while AI’s repertoire of tasks does not. No amount of
adaptation is going to produce representational solutions when representation does
not benefit the solution. In this light the paradox is really no more paradoxical than
the absence of eyes in a species evolved in the dark. This simple explanation meets
one obvious objection: cognition is a black box. What goes on inside is invisible to
the environment, and hence the environment cannot select for representational
architecture. This objection is wrong. Below we show how environments can select
for representation, both theoretically and computationally.
We said connectionist systems are usually produced using approximations of
evolution or learning. To combine the two is generally viewed as double the hassle
with nothing to gain. This is a mistake. It is through the interaction between
evolution and learning processes that correspondence enters the picture.
We will distinguish two classes of correspondence, innate correspondence (IC)
and acquired correspondence (AC). As the terminology suggests, IC covers
correspondence relations that are present at birth (or more precisely, are direct
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products of a more or less fixed developmental process). Examples could be innate
representations of predator species and other dangers, of what does or does not
constitute food, or, more abstractly, the fundamental properties of space that one
needs in order to make sense of sense data and coordinate one’s motions. ICs are
features of the species (roughly the same in each intact specimen), and are products
of evolution. To understand the emergence of IC we should ask how an evolutionary
environment can exert selection pressure for IC.
AC, on the other hand, covers correspondence relations that are acquired via
learning processes. For example, many species are capable of forming map-like
representations (known as ‘‘cognitive maps’’) of their surroundings to help them
navigate. Another example are the representations used to navigate a dynamic and
individual-specific social environment. ACs are features of individual specimen,
and are acquired within the specimen’s lifetime. They are products of learning,
while the mechanisms responsible for acquiring them are products of evolution
(note the stacking of adaptation levels here). To understand the emergence of AC
we should ask how an evolutionary environment can exert selection pressure for
acquisition mechanisms for AC. As IC and AC differ in the way they are selected
for, they receive separate treatment below.
While both IC and AC can be viewed as (bases of) representation, we reserve the
term mental representation for AC (we will return to this point later on).
Innate Correspondence
This section discusses the evolution of IC. We start with the theory, illustrate it with
a toy example, discuss a computational investigation, and take a brief look at how
IC features in natural cognition.
Innate Correspondence: Theory
Here we give a theory of the evolution of IC.
We define a behaviour (B) as a mapping from stimuli (S) to responses (R):
B : S ! R
We define learning (B0) as a mapping from stimulus-behaviour pairs to behaviours,
i.e. ‘‘stimulus-caused updates of behaviour’’:
B0 : S; Bð Þ ! B i:e:
B0 : S; S ! Rð Þ ! S ! Rð Þ
This definition of learning is broad, including things one would not usually want to
call learning. A blow to the head is a stimulus, and may cause a lasting change in
behaviour via processes that bear little resemblance to learning processes. For our
present purpose, however, it is enough that all learning processes fall under the
definition. Note that any form of memory that affects behaviour, even very short
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term, is also included under this definition. This is intentional; we do indeed con-
sider such effects a form of learning here.
We also define the environment (E) as a mapping, one from responses to stimuli.
An agent acts, and this (potentially) affects the subsequent stimulus it receives:
E : R ! S
Note that an environment is much like an inverse behaviour (mapping responses to
stimuli instead of stimuli to responses). And just as behaviour may change, so may
the environment, either as a result of the agent’s responses or spontaneously:
E0 : R; Eð Þ ! E
We have defined behaviour, learning and environment as mappings, but organisms
and environments are physical objects, not mathematical objects. In order for these
mappings to exist in the physical world they must have implementations. For each
of the mappings defined above, we let its lowercase partner denote its implemen-
tation: b, b0, e, e0. The relation between mappings and implementations is one-to-
many: just as infinitely many programs may realize the same input–output relation,
infinitely many implementations may realize the same stimulus–response mapping.
Implementations e and e0 should be understood as the actual physical reality of the
environment. The physical environment also determines the fitness effects of
responses, but this information is not in general communicated to the organism. In
reality, e and e0 are generally not clearly distinguishable, but this is of little
importance to our project.
Implementations b and b0 are products of evolution, and as we said (theoretically)
infinitely many options are available. We can expect evolution to favour those
implementations that are execution-efficient, with respect to whatever resource
restrictions the environment presents. A fast implementation if time is scarce, an
‘‘eco’’ implementation if energy is scarce, etc. As long as the mapping remains
intact, evolution will cut whatever implementational corners it can (maybe even
trading some deterioration of the mapping for a performance boost). As the history
of connectionism illustrates, these conditions do not lead evolution towards
representational solutions much, and indeed there is no reason to think they should.
The goal criteria we have (making the right mapping and making it efficient) give
direction to evolution, but nothing suggests that these are pointing towards
correspondence (given the overhead representational solutions carry, efficiency may
well direct evolution away from them). The stimulus–response box remains pretty
black.
Learning updates behaviour on a within-lifetime timescale, and evolution updates
both behaviour and learning ability on an evolutionary timescale. Figure 1 gives a
graphical representation of the processes involved.
If the environment is dynamic in a sufficiently organized and predictable way as
to make learning possible, then there is selection pressure on evolution of B0.
Different implementations of B (i.e. different b) call for different implementations
of B0 (i.e. different b0). For example in the highly unnatural case that b would take
the form of a table defining an output for each possible input independently, then b0
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would operate by rewriting entries of this table. So whether and how feasible
evolution of B0 is strongly depends on the architecture of b. If there is selection
pressure on B0, then mutations in b that are beneficial to B0 are beneficial mutations
(even if they have no effect whatsoever on B). As an extreme scenario, we could
imagine B remaining stable while b evolves to facilitate B0. This possibility shows
that there is a fundamental difference between selection for a specific mapping and
selection for a specific implementation of that mapping. Evolution working on
B alone does not care much about the precise architecture of b, but evolution
working on B0 does. This gives us a possible explanation for how there can be
selection pressure towards a specific b, without violating the ‘‘black box’’ intuition
that b is hidden from the environment: as illustrated in Fig. 1, selection for specific
implementation structure arises inside the black box, as part of the selection for B0
‘‘splits off’’ into selection for B0-friendly b.
B0 constrains the structure of b, but we haven’t said anything yet about what sort
of b is favoured by B0. We will claim that B0 benefits most from b that are in some
sense isomorphic with the environment. The basic idea is as follows: If the
environment and (consequently) the optimal behaviour are static, then difference in
the structure of their implementations poses no problem. But if the environment and
(consequently) the optimal behaviour may change (due to E0 and B0, respectively),
then the more the structure of b and e differ, the harder it is for B0 to update B in
sync with E0. The implementations (e) of environments that cognition evolves in are
composed of many distinct features (food sources, temperatures, other agents,
spatial layouts, etc.) that act and interact to give rise to E. Let’s call a change in one
single feature a simple change. Simple changes in e often lead to complex changes in
E: multiple input–output pairs change. Consequently a complex update of B is
required. If b contains a feature that corresponds to the changed feature of e, in a
functionally similar position, then the required complex change in B can be realized
by a simple change in b. This makes B0 quite feasible. If no such corresponding
feature exists, a complex implementation update is required. In this case no
straightforward relation exists between the environmental change and the
appropriate behaviour change, making life difficult or infeasible for B0. So the
Fig. 1 Selection for IC. Gray box environment. Black box cognition. Black arrows update processes.
D environmental update processes. L learning processes. White arrows regular selection pressures. Gray
arrow diverted selection pressures. Letters on selection pressure arrows indicate what is selected for: EE
execution-efficiency. UE update-efficiency. B behaviour function. b implementation of behaviour
function. B0 learning function. b0 implementation of learning function. E environment function.
e implementation of environment function. E0 environmental change function. e0 implementation of
environmental change function
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organization that evolves in b to facilitate B0 should in one form or another capture
the variable features of the environment along with their functional roles therein.1
Note that we neither claim that B0 is strictly impossible without correspondence
relations between the features of e and b (the issue is practical, not mathematical,
infeasibility of optimal-yet-isomorphism-free b), nor that correspondence cannot
occur in absence of B0. What we claim is that selection pressure on B0 translates into
selection pressure on b to form correspondence relations with fitness-relevant
features of e, and that this ‘‘selection pressure conversion’’ is an organizing factor in
the evolution of cognition, directing it towards representational solutions.
Two points of caution apply: (1) Even with such selection pressure in place, it is
not guaranteed that correspondence will evolve. Selection for execution-efficiency
may be stronger and, like we said, may point away from representational solutions
due to their overhead. For correspondence to emerge, the fitness gains from update-
efficiency must outweigh the costs incurred on execution efficiency, so we should
think of scenarios where species can afford to carry around some brainpower and
have substantial benefit to gain from efficient learning. (2) Note that in general, not
all of b receives the organizing influence of diagonal selection. Innate behaviour that
is impervious to modification by learning should not be affected. However, the parts
of b that are modifiable by learning seem quite central to advanced cognition, and
the theory provides a candidate explanation of why these parts should be organized
as they are.
Innate Correspondence: Examples
Figure 2 shows (rather arbitrary) images depicting an environment function (E) and
(two instances of) the target behaviour function for this environment (Bx and By). If
it seems odd to depict functions like images, think of it as follows: the environment
sends the organism stimuli in the form of coordinate pairs, and the organism reacts
with one of two responses, say 0 or 1. The environment checks against its image
whether the gray value at the location indicated by the stimulus is closer to black or
to white. If closer to black, the organism receives a reward for responding 0, and if
closer to black for responding 1. This means that if we lay out the ideal responses
for all stimuli in the form of an image, with 0 shown as black and 1 as white, we get
the image given by Bx and By. Figure 2 also gives the implementation structure
(e) of E, and two possible implementation structures (bx and by) for B (cognitions x
and y). Cognition x composes the target behaviour out of four square pieces,
arranging them side to side. Cognition y composes the target behaviour out of three
differently shaped pieces, overlaying them on one another.
1 Programmers may recognize something in this: If one codes a program for handling a fixed set of input
data on a specific device, one can go and gain performance by cutting corners: exploiting the peculiarities
of the data and device (common practice in early console game development). Such code gains efficiency
at the cost of flexibility. On the other hand, code that needs to run on many different devices and/or may
later have to be modified or expanded (possibly by a different programmer) is usually written with a fair
bit of performance overhead, trading efficiency for modifiability. When mutation and selection are doing
the programming, they will naturally take the former approach, unless forced to take the latter approach
by environmental demands for modifiability.
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If we ask whether x or y best realizes the target behaviour, the answer is that
neither is better than the other; they implement the exact same function. In terms of
execution efficiency, we may observe that if we add up the surfaces of all pieces, y
has some overhead compared to x. The structure of cognition y reflects that of the
environment, but there is no good reason why selection on the behaviour function
alone should pick y from the infinite number of possible candidates.
Now let’s say that this was just a snapshot, and that the environment is dynamic.
Figure 3 is an extension of Fig. 2, now marked with time indices (i and j). Between i
and j, the environment has changed. The figure also adds another cognition (z).
We see that the component parts comprising the environment have shifted around
a bit, leading the environment function to change, from Ei to Ej. Now we put
ourselves in the shoes of x and y’s learning ability and try to adapt Bx and By to this
change. (To be accurate, we would have to do this on basis of reward information
we receive response by response, without directly observing Ej). It shall be obvious
that updating cognition y will be fairly straightforward. In the case of cognition x
however, we cannot make the update while retaining the given implementation
structure. We would need to cut the pieces into pieces, and even so it would prove
quite a challenge (note the change in overlap between the shapes). If we were
learning ability, we would definitely have an easier time working with cognition y.
What gives the structure of cognition y the advantage is not that it is particularly
suitable for implementing Bi; x is just as good for that (if not better). It is also not
that it is particularly suitable for implementing Bj; z is just as good for that (if not
better). The advantage of y is in the fact that it can match with minimal effort the
way an environment with this structure changes. Hence its advantage only exists in
the presence of learning ability.
Of course, there is one implementation structure that can match any environment
without ever needing to cut up a single piece. If we simply bring a big pile of loose
pixels (call this cognition p for short), we can match any target without concerning
ourselves about structure. This is true, but consider what happens to the search
space, and recall that we should be doing our updating on basis of a thin trickle of
reward information. While a learning system working with cognition y is searching
Fig. 2 Implementation and function of an environment and two behaviours. Under a static environment,
correspondence-based implementation (y) has no advantage over other implementations (e.g. x)
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the space of images composable of implementation y, a learning system working
with the pixel pile would be searching the space of all possible images, a vastly
larger space (notably, standard neural network learning algorithms would take the
approach of cognition p). The situation can be likened to a game of Battleship,2
where player y knows about the number of ships and their sizes, players x and z
have mistaken beliefs about the ships and their sizes, while player p has no prior
knowledge of any sort whatsoever.
Where, if anywhere, could we recognize IC in nature? Where IC results from
selection for learning, one would expect it to be expressed in the form of ‘‘learning
bias’’. Learning bias is the well-known phenomenon that when a test subject is
presented with different learning tasks that have the same form and difficulty in
abstract but differ in the actual stimuli and responses involved, performance will
often differ substantially between those tasks, with higher performance on tasks that
fit better with the test subject’s natural context. Consider this example given by
Gould and Gould (1994): it is easy to teach a rat to press a lever to receive a food
reward, and easy to teach a rat to jump to avoid electric shock, but nearly impossible
to teach a rat to jump for a food reward or press a lever to avoid electric shock,
despite the fact that these tasks are identical in abstract. These observations make
sense when we consider the rat’s natural context: rats often procure food via manual
manipulations, but never by jumping (rat food does not fly). The rat’s cognitive
architecture is such that the formation of new connections between manual
manipulations and food reward occurs with relative ease, suggesting that in some
sense, their learning ability relies on (tacit) knowledge about food. Or for another
example, for a rat to form associations between an action and a reward usually
Fig. 3 Under a dynamic environment, correspondence-based implementation (y) has the advantage
2 A classic pen and pencil game where players arrange a fleet of ‘‘battleships’’ (lines of various lengths)
on a grid, without revealing the arrangement to their opponent, after which they take turns ‘‘firing shots’’
at cells in the opponent’s grid, trying to sink the opponent’s ships by hitting all the cells occupied by
every ship. Players inform each other only about hits and sunk ships.
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requires the time span between action and reward to be short (on the order of
seconds), with little or no intervening distractions. However, when rats experience
sickness they will readily associate this negative reward signal with the taste of
foods or liquids ingested hours before the onset of the sickness (the rat will develop
an aversion to that particular food), but not with other stimuli, even if other stimuli
precede the onset of sickness more closely (see e.g. Garcia et al. 1966). The rat’s
learning ability expresses presuppositions that sickness can be caused by food or
liquids but not by, say, bells or lights, and furthermore that a substantial amount of
time elapses between ingestion of bad food and the onset of sickness. Somehow the
rat’s learning ability exploits facts about rat physiology. The rat has no declarative
knowledge of these facts, but its cognitive architecture is structured such that it is
readily modified in accordance with these facts. In this implicit, operational sense,
the rat’s cognitive architecture expresses valid presuppositions about the way the
world works. This characteristic gives the architecture an advantage over
alternatives exactly because it supports learning (the presuppositions in question
would have no use to a non-learner). Therefore it can be hypothesized to have
evolved as a result of selection for learning. Our theory is that this alignment of a
cognition’s learning characteristics with the way the world actually works is
underpinned by an alignment of structure, i.e. correspondence.
Innate Correspondence: Experimental Work
We have tested the theory laid out above using a computational model in which
agents controlled by neural networks are evolved (using a genetic algorithm, see e.g.
Goldberg 1989) to learn a simple food collecting task. A detailed description of the
model and experiments can be found in Arnold et al. (2013). We necessitate
evolution of learning by randomizing the relation between network output and the
agents’ actions. This produces a situation in which ‘‘newborn’’ agents are
necessarily incapable of fit behaviour, as they don’t know what signal to send to
their ‘‘bodies’’ in order to make a given movement. They can, however, observe the
effects of the signals they send to their bodies (their own displacement within the
environment). The challenge for evolution is thus to devise a learning function (B0)
that takes this information and applies it to overcome the randomization of the
relation between neural output and action. The neural networks were composed of
neurons that control behaviour (this set of neurons corresponds to b in the above)
and neurons that control the modification of connection weights between the first set
of neurons (corresponding to b0 above). The latter set of neurons operated on a
modified version of the neuromodulation technique of Soltoggio et al. (2007, 2008).
For comparison, we also evolved populations of networks to perform the same
target behaviour innately, without randomization of the relation between neural
output and action (i.e. no need for learning) and without the b0 structures (i.e. no
possibility of learning). This let us compare b structures evolved with and without
selection for learning ability. If our theory is correct, then we should expect to see a
difference in evolved b structures between these populations, with the latter showing
a more diffuse neural organization while the former should show a structure that is
optimized for modification by learning, incorporating structural features of the task.
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Such effects were indeed observed. First off, variability of structure of b was
markedly lower across trails (repetitions of the evolutionary process) when learning
was required, indicating that selection for learning constrained evolution to a
smaller set of implementation options. The b that evolved under selection for
learning were also found to be more focused and compact, involving only a small
subset of the available neurons, while without learning, b was seen to spread out
diffusely over the available neurons. This compactness of the learners’ solutions
was a consequence of the way their learning operated. Their neurons were seen to
specialize on specific choices between actions, using a simple principle. One can
split the set of ‘‘possible situations’’ into subsets on basis of what action is the most
appropriate response to it. The behaviourally relevant neurons each picked out two
such sets of situations, responding negatively to situation belonging to one set and
positively to situations belonging to the other. For example, we found a neuron
activating positively when a step forward would be a good move and negatively
when a left turn would be a good move. The distinguishing of situations was no finer
than the crude action repertoire, but the neurons were picking out the features that
called for ‘‘their’’ specific pair of actions with high precision, while leaving the
features relevant to other actions to other neurons. This setup allowed the agent
peculiar learning feats. For example, thanks to the aforementioned forward/left
neuron, an agent finding itself turning left in a situation where a step forward would
have been a good move would not just decrease its tendency to turn left in that or
similar situations (thereby increasing its tendency to step forward instead), but it
would also increase its tendency to turn left in (non-current) situations where a left
turn actually is a good move, simply by assigning negative weight to the connection
between this neuron and the active output neuron. Minimization of the size of
b meant that every connection weight modification within b came to have such
‘‘side-effects’’ on other situations and actions. In an ideal b, these side-effects are
advantageous (as is the one described), and this then becomes the target for
evolution under selection for learning. The result is that the nets do not just stumble
about randomly trying actions and learning only when something happened to work
out well (as reinforcement-based learning would have them); they apply the
information they gain via experimentation across situations they aren’t currently in,
learning as if they recognized their own action as this or that action. While the
simplicity of the model does not allow for much display of intelligence, the nets
certainly went about their task a little smarter than mere trial and error learning
would ever have let them.
Lastly, and maybe most strikingly, b evolved under selection for learning showed
a conspicuous symmetry, with the left and right halves of the visual input being
handled with mirror versions of the same general connection patterns. Such
symmetry was altogether lacking in b evolved in absence of selection for learning.
That such a fundamental feature as symmetry only found its way into the cognitive
architecture under selection for learning is maybe the clearest indication that
selection for learning is a factor to take into account when discussing the evolution
of cognitive architecture.
The theory so far provides a partial explanation for the origin of correspondence,
and for why it is often lacking in neural nets. Evolution can make IC, but the
Selection for Representation in Higher-Order Adaptation 83
123
environment does have to select for it, and the environment does this when it selects
for learning. The intuition that cognition is a black box to the environment is true at
any given moment (any given stimulus–response exchange), but not over extended
time when within-lifetime adaptation is involved.
It’s worth noting that the interaction hypothesized here between learning and
evolution can also occur between other pairs of adaptation processes, as long as we
have one adaptation process at a larger timescale shaping another adaptation process
at a shorter timescale. Crombach and Hogeweg (2008) show how lineage level
evolution (large timescale) can speed up evolution at a smaller timescale in an
environment with a cyclic dynamic (an effect known as ‘‘evolution of
evolvability’’). They observe that this acceleration is achieved by evolving what
they call an ‘‘evolutionary sensor’’: a genome structure emerges that can track the
cyclic environmental dynamic very efficiently, with mutation of just one or very few
genome locations. Such ‘‘evolution bias’’ is straightforwardly analogous to learning
bias, and evolutionary sensors could be said to correspond to the environmental
state variables they track.
So far we have focused on IC, but how about AC? In the next sections we shift
our focus (by one adaptation level), and discuss the evolution of mechanisms for
within-lifetime acquisition of novel correspondences between a cognitive system
and its environment.
Acquired Correspondence
In this section we extend the theory on IC to cover AC. We show how the theory
applies to a well-known example of mental representation, and how the proposed
theory lets us bring it within reach of connectionist modelling. We then briefly
discuss our computational investigations.
From Innate Correspondence to Acquired Correspondence: Theory
We said that we view mental representation (MR) here as correspondence acquired
via learning, that is, as correspondence produced by b0 on a within-lifetime
timescale from interaction between organism and environment. But as the
perceptive reader will have noticed, b0 falls outside the scope of the organizing
influence of learning ability (as b0 is itself not modified by b0). So the theory so far
cannot capture MR. All we have so far is correspondence produced over the course
of generations, by evolution.
But let’s put that differently: we do have a mechanism for acquisition of
correspondence, it’s just that for explaining MR it operates on the wrong level: IC is
acquired on the species-level, over the course of evolution. We want to make this
process, of correspondence-acquisition, occur within each individual specimen
instead. Luckily, for emergence of correspondence to occur, nothing much depends
on the precise nature of the adaptation processes involved. We can just replace the
evolution process (population-level adaptation) with a learning process (individual-
level adaptation), and the learning process with, well, something else. Something
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that relates to learning as learning relates to evolution: if correspondence-based b
emerges under selection for B0, then correspondence-based b0 should result from
selection for B00:
B00 : S; B0ð Þ ! B0 i:e: :
B00 : S; S; S ! Rð Þð Þ ! S ! Rð Þð Þ ! S; S ! Rð Þð Þ ! S ! Rð Þð Þ
So what is B00? B00 is a cognitive function that updates learning ability (updates the
function that updates behaviour), in other words, B00 is second order learning (or
‘‘meta-learning’’). Selection for modifiability of learning ability should result in
correspondence-based learning ability, learning ability that operates by acquiring,
on the fly, correspondence relations with the environment, or in other words,
representations.
We are not the first to suggest a deep link between second order learning and
representational cognition. Approaching the issue from a different angle, Harry
Harlow (in his seminal paper on learning sets) already wrote: ‘‘[L]earning to learn
transforms the organism from a creature that adapts to a changing environment by
trial and error to one that adapts by seeming hypothesis and insight’’ (Harlow 1949).
Note that the interaction pattern suggested here involves three adaptation
processes: evolution, learning, and second order learning. The evolution of second
order learning guides the evolution of learning towards representational solutions.
This somewhat cryptic proposition is shown in abstract in Fig. 4, but let us
illustrate it with a concrete example. We will look at a well-known experiment
designed to test for the ability to form and use ‘‘cognitive maps’’ (mental
representations of spatial layouts). That is, the experiment is designed to expose the
presence of AC to an outside observer, by teasing out action choices that cannot
reasonably be explained without ascribing representational abilities to the test
subject. ‘‘Outside observer’’ here would be the experimenter, but as action choice
affects fitness, naturally occurring variants of the experiment expose representation
ability to natural selection. Upfront, it might already be objected that such an
experiment cannot exist. Strictly speaking, we indeed cannot infer representational
structure from any sequence of actions. Yet intuitively, it is hard to imagine how the
Fig. 4 Selection for correspondence acquisition (see caption Fig. 1 for details)
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experimental task could be solved without a map-like representation. We show that
the theory outlined above can reconcile fact and intuition: The action sequence that
solves the task is proof not of representation, but of second order learning. Second
order learning is theoretically possible but practically infeasible without correspon-
dence, hence our intuition.
Tolman’s Detour Maze
In experimental psychology, MR ability in biological species has often been studied
using Tolman’s detour mazes (Tolman and Honzik 1930). These mazes have
multiple paths (at least three) from their start to their goal, varying in length (see
Fig. 5). The shorter two paths join at some distance before the goal position. The
experiment runs as follows: a rat is fed to satiation, then placed at the start of the
maze. A food reward is placed at the goal position. The rat explores the maze, and
eventually finds the food reward, but, being satiated, does not eat it. After the rat has
thoroughly explored the maze, it is taken out (of the maze). We call this the
exploration phase. Later, once the rat is hungry, it is placed again at the start
position in the maze. The rat will now typically try to run the shortest path to the
goal position and eat the reward. We call this the exploitation phase. This shows
latent learning ability, but can still be explained as highly adaptive learning bias (the
rat may have acquired an action sequence or state-action mapping that takes it from
start to goal, without representing the spatial structure of the maze). However, in
this phase MR ability can be revealed by blocking the shortest path and observing
the rat’s reaction. If the shortest path is blocked such that the medium path is still
open (in Fig. 5: blocked at a cell with only a white dot) then the rat would ideally
choose the medium path. If the shortest path is blocked such that the medium path is
blocked too (in Fig. 5: blocked at a cell with both a white and a grey dot), then the
long path is the correct choice. If the rat, upon encountering the blockage,
backtracks to the start position and then (consistently over multiple trials) picks the
new optimal path, then this taken as evidence of MR ability: If the rat had merely
learned to solve the maze using an action sequence or state-action mapping, then
finding one path blocked would tell it nothing about the viability of the other paths.
So if it can pick the correct path right away, then it seems that it must have grasped
Fig. 5 (Randomly generated) detour mazes
86 S. Arnold et al.
123
the spatial relations between the paths. That is, it seems that it must have a spatial
representation of the maze. Note that we recognize MR here by the absence of trial-
and-error: we would not ascribe MR ability to the rat if it would need to try the other
two paths to figure out which choice is now optimal.
Second Order Learning in Tolman’s Detour Maze
Now we place the detour maze task in the theoretical framework introduced above.
The maze task is composed of paths (or ‘‘accessible space’’, to be more precise),
walls (‘‘inaccessible space’’), and a food reward. These are the aspects of e,
implementing E. We see that a simple change in e (replacing one piece of accessible
space with inaccessible space) leads to complex changes in E and consequently calls
for a complex update of B (running a different path altogether). We also find
ourselves strongly inclined to ascribe the ability to mentally represent spatial layouts
to an animal if it can make this complex update of B in an instant (without further
exploration) upon observing the blockage. We know that when we ourselves update
our behaviour in such manner, we do so using our mental representation abilities.
We said that mental representation is a form of AC. Our theoretical framework
explains the evolution of correspondence-acquisition at b0 as a consequence of
evolution under selection for B00. Can we recognize B00 in the detour maze
experiment?
When after blockage of the shortest path a rat infers the new optimal path without
additional exploration, we can view this inference as a split-second B0 process: a
stimulus (observation of the location of the blockage) produced a change in
behaviour (the rat abandons the blocked path and switches to the new optimal path).
For B0 to produce such a fast and effective and ‘‘context-sensitive’’ behaviour-
update, B0 itself must have been adapted to the maze (the update cannot be the result
of fixed pre-existing learning ability, as the information in the observation alone
does not suffice to explain the update without reference to the specific layout of this
maze). The optimal update in behaviour has come to be causable by minimal
information, and in this otherwise inexplicable efficiency of B0, we observe the
existence of a B00 process.
So what the outwardly observable behaviour of solving a detour maze shows us,
strictly speaking, is not MR but second order learning. Why are we so inclined to
ascribe MR when we observe B00? Because B00 calls for correspondence-based b0,
just like B0 called for correspondence-based b in our discussion of IC. Maybe our
intuition latches on to the feasibility argument more easily here, as now we are not
talking about a function that updates a function, but about a function that updates a
function that updates a function (the size of a tabular implementation would
increase exponentially with update order).
We noted that the absence of trial and error (exploration) after the rat encounters
the blockage is crucial for us to ascribe the rat MR. This link between MR and
absence of trial and error has generality beyond the detour maze task, and
necessarily runs via second order learning. If an organism performs all of its
learning with fixed, innate learning ability, then the characteristics of the
environment cannot actively be exploited to reduce trial and error. The innate
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learning function of the species (B0 unaltered by B00) may have been optimized to the
evolutionary environment over the course of evolution, but in order for the learning
ability of an individual to be optimized, on the fly, to the specifics of its current
environment (e.g. a specific detour maze), there must be some within-lifetime
adaptation process working on it. An adaptation process working on learning itself
is by definition a second order learning process.
The view outlined above suggests a novel computational pathway into MR,
which we discuss in the next section.
Second Order Neural Plasticity
We have computationally investigated second order learning in detour mazes, as
well as in a simple social scenario. As in our computational work on IC, we forwent
general-purpose first order learning algorithms, letting B0 evolve instead. And with
no general-purpose second order learning algorithms to forego, we left B00 up to
evolution as well. We will outline our experiments shortly, but first let us discuss
what is required for evolution of B00.
The neural basis of learning is neural plasticity. Given neural plasticity, learning
ability can evolve, as happened in the computational work on IC. Would the neural
basis of second order learning ability then be second order neural plasticity? What
does that even mean?
In natural brains, the strengths of synapses (‘‘connection weights’’) are modified
not by an external update algorithm (as is common in AI), but they change as a
function of the activation levels of the neurons they connect, modulated by various
chemicals (neuromodulators). Release of neuromodulators is itself controlled by
neural structures. Figure 6b gives a schematic representation of this concept. We
may have a circuit that implements the current behaviour (b) and a circuit that
controls the connection weight changes in that circuit (b0). This is first order neural
Fig. 6 Plasticity in neural circuits. Circuits receive stimuli (S) on their input neurons (I) and return
responses (R) via their output neurons (O). A connection’s plasticity is determined by the amount of
modulation it receives. The images show (near minimal) examples of the schemas a neural network must
contain in order for it to (potentially) express learning of a particular order using neuromodulation.
a Circuit with fixed behaviour (no learning). b Circuit with first order learning. The b0 circuit controls
modification of the b circuit. c Circuit with second order learning. The b00 circuit controls modification of
the b0 circuit. d Alternative second order circuit. (Note that networks need not express these structures on
a global level, and substructures within the schema can be elaborate networks in themselves. For the
possibility of second order learning effects to exist we merely need a given schema to occur somewhere in
the network. Furthermore, b, b0 and b00 may overlap.)
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plasticity. With it, we can make a system that modifies its own behaviour in
response to stimuli (not just responding differently to different stimuli, but
permanently modifying its stimulus–response mapping in response to stimuli). That
is, B0.
We can get to second order neural plasticity simply by adding another circuit (b00)
that modifies the connection weights in the b0 circuit (Fig. 6c). Modifying the b0
circuit effectively modifies the way the b circuit is modified, so using b00 circuits we
can make systems that can modify the way they modify their behaviour in response
to stimuli. That is, B00. The schema of Fig. 6d shows an alternative where plasticity
loci are linked serially instead of in parallel. Though less intuitive, this too can
produce second order learning effects.3
Neuromodulation-mediated connection weight change is not the only option for
lasting behaviour modification. Connection ‘‘loops’’ that hold on to activation over
time (as used in recurrent neural networks) can do the job too, and circuits with such
loops too can be stacked to create second order update dynamics. In natural brains,
neuromodulation-mediated connection weight change is associated with long-term
memory and neural ‘‘echo’’ loops with short-term memory, but the distinction is not
of importance here.
If our theoretical framework is correct, then availability of second order plasticity
circuitry to an evolving neural system (i.e. existence in the search space of networks
containing circuits with second order plasticity) is crucial to evolution of MR, and
any successful solution must feature second order plasticity. As discussed above,
MR makes B00 feasible, so selection for B00 points towards MR. But for that to
happen, the species must be susceptible to selection for B00, and in order to be
susceptible to selection for B00, it needs the possibility of second order neural
plasticity circuitry—a possibility that is typically missing in AI systems.4 Again we
discuss some computational work, in which this time we looked at what happens
when we make second order plasticity available to a population of neural networks
evolving in environments that select for second order learning.
B00 and Correspondence: Experimental Work
We have tested our ideas in two pieces of computational work. This first targets
spatial representation, the second social representation. Detailed descriptions of the
experiments can be found in Arnold et al. (2012, 2014), respectively.
3 To see how a circuit like this can produce second order change at the stimulus–response level, consider
what happens with either b0 circuit’s ability to modify the behaviour when the other b0 circuit sets the
connection weight it controls to zero: the circuit loses its ability to modify behaviour. Hence
modifications by either b0 circuit can affect whether or not the other circuit can modify behaviour. By the
same token more subtle second order plasticity effects are possible too.
4 Take for example the error back-propagation algorithms. This is a class of algorithms that adjusts
connection weights so as to bring the output for a given input pattern closer to some target output for that
input pattern. Algorithms of this class are also at the core of many implementations of Reinforcement
Learning. In error back-propagation, the whole network acts as a single plasticity locus, all weight
changes geared to modify behaviour, with no modification of the learning process itself.
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Evolving Spatial Representation
We made a population of simple agents, living on tiny grid worlds, capable of
moving to adjacent cells in the four cardinal directions, and of observing the
accessibility of adjacent cells. We gave the agents randomly generated neural
networks for brains, meaning they were initially incapable of any useful behaviour
whatsoever, spending most of their lives bumping into walls helplessly. We
presented them with a variety of simple navigation tasks, as well as the full-fledged
detour maze task as described above. The simpler tasks were included to get
evolution on its way, selecting for basic abilities such as walking a path or
remembering a location.
It should be said that the neural networks serving as brains were no everyday
garden variety NNs. We introduced some structural features based on the neurology
of cognitive maps in rats (in particular, we provided uniformly connected grids of
neurons as building blocks, inspired by the structure of the rat hippocampus), as
well as various neurotransmitters. These made it comparatively easy for memory
structures to emerge. The main feature for our purpose however was again the use of
neuromodulation, and of echo loops, as these make possible the evolution of circuits
with second order neural plasticity. We let the nets evolve using a simple genetic
algorithm.
We found that provided with this possibility of second order learning, the
networks evolved to solve the detour maze task. Their solutions prominently
featured acquisition of correspondence (encoding the layout of the maze in either
connection weight patterns or neural activation patterns), as one would intuitively
expect from anything that solves a detour maze. The setup of the neural nets
facilitated evolution of such solutions, but the fact that they did indeed evolve shows
that the nets were being subjected to selection for mechanisms for correspondence
acquisition. As we argued, correspondence acquisition is not something an
environment can directly select for. What we did select for, with the detour maze
environment, was second order learning. The possibility for second order plasticity
made the nets susceptible to this selection pressure. Indeed, all observed solutions
crucially relied on circuitry of at least second order plasticity for solving the detour
maze task: they used second order learning to solve the task.5 But second order
learning is practically infeasible without correspondence acquisition. Hence direct
5 We predicted that the detour maze task can be solved with second order learning, and cannot be solved
with first order learning alone. Our computational results confirm the former and corroborate the latter
prediction, but our experiments of course cannot prove that the task is strictly unsolvable without second
order plasticity (the fact that we see no such solutions does not imply that they do not exist). Some readers
may object that detour mazes have been solved using Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms, which we
said are restricted to first order learning. As far as we are aware of, RL solutions to detour mazes and other
latent learning tasks invariably extend the core RL algorithm with additional mechanisms to capture
structural aspects of the task in some form or another (see e.g. Voicu and Schmajuk 2002; Gerard et al.
2005), and use information gathered by that mechanism to guide the learning process. In other words,
such approaches hard-code a representational faculty, and use it to realize second order learning. The
necessity of such mechanisms for solving detour maze tasks with RL corresponds directly to the need for
second order plasticity in our model.
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selection for second order learning ability put the nets under indirect selection for
mechanisms for acquisition of correspondence, as the theory predicts.
Evolving Social Representation
Next we evolved a very simple form of social cognition. Agents are evolved to (1)
perform a base behaviour and (2) predict the actions of a partner agent performing
the base behaviour. For the base behaviour agents must pick actions in accordance
with the current environment and their current mental state (a small bit string).
Optimal behaviour here is set arbitrarily, agents simply have to match it. When
predicting others’ actions, agents see the environment but not the mental state of the
partner agent. Hence the prediction task requires agents to observe the partner agent
and learn (they have to ‘‘get to know’’ the other agent before they can predict its
behaviour in various environments). Networks are evolved to solve this task, using
again a simple neuromodulation mechanism to allow for evolution of the requisite
learning ability. This time we avoided any pre-imposed structure.
We let the mental state of the partner change frequently, but only one bit at a
time. This produces a second order learning task (unsolvable with supervised
learning). Analysis of the networks evolved under these conditions show that they
learn by decoding the partner’s mental state from its behaviour. Small sets of
connections in these nets are found to encode the individual bits of the partner’s
mental state, allowing us to read (and even modify) individual bits of knowledge.
These solutions show highly specific AC.
In a set of control experiments, we kept the mental state of the partner agent
constant over the duration of the interaction. This produces a first order learning task
(essentially supervised learning). Bit-level representation of the partner’s mental
state is not evident in nets evolved using this task. Instead these solutions show
effective learning with fuzzy correspondence.
These findings lend further support to the idea that evolutionary selection for
second order learning is selection for cognitive mechanisms for acquiring specific
correspondence.
Discussion
We have discussed two types of correspondence, innate and acquired, and how they
may emerge from interacting adaptation processes. Early on we noted that we
reserve the term mental representation for AC. Having discussed examples of IC
and AC, it may now be clear why we choose this terminology. In the examples we
considered, the correspondences that we theorize to underlie learning bias are likely
opaque to the organism implementing them. The fact that, in a rat’s natural
environment, a manual manipulation is more likely than a jump to produce a food
reward is expressed in the rat’s learning ability, but we have little reason to ascribe
the rat epistemic access to this fact. On the other hand, if we think of cognitive maps
and other such ACs, then it’s hard to see how they could serve their function without
their host having epistemic access to them. The question whether this is a qualitative
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difference between innate and acquired correspondence or merely an artefact of our
choice of examples is left for another occasion (hence the terminology should be
considered tentative).
The theory suggests a deep relation between second order learning and MR, but
this relation is a subtle one, so let us stress the following: We are not saying that MR
‘‘is’’ second order learning (whatever that would mean). We are saying that
selection for second order learning partially diverts into selection for correspon-
dence acquisition abilities (for feasibility of second order learning). Such
correspondence acquisition abilities are representation abilities (and the correspon-
dences acquired are representations). This justifies the inclination to ascribe an
organism MR abilities when we see it solve second order learning tasks (such as
Tolman’s detour mazes or Harlow’s learning set tasks): ability to solve second order
learning tasks indicates that the species has evolved under exposure to selection for
correspondence acquisition abilities.
Although one may need second order tasks to elicit external indication of MR, we
should not infer that MR is the evolutionary product exclusively of detour mazes
and other scenarios that strictly require second order learning to be solvable. Any
scenario that selects for speedy learning selects for second order learning, just like
any scenario that selects for speedy locomotion selects for acceleration.6 Hence
selection for second order learning may be more ubiquitous than it would seem if we
only consider explicitly second order tasks.
Let us now briefly return to the debate noted in the introduction, surrounding
connectionism’s viability as a paradigm for studying mind. Representation is a
crucial feature of advanced cognition, but connectionist systems generally fail to
show representationality. This isn’t because connectionism is unfit as a paradigm for
modelling mind. It’s because connectionist systems generally aren’t exposed to
selection for representationality, while natural cognition is. We deem it a virtue of
the paradigm that connectionist systems can work in both highly diffuse ways and
highly representational ways, as this means we can use them to evaluate the effects
of all sorts of environments and selection pressures on their representationality, and
thereby learn about the evolutionary origins of mind. However this potential has
remained largely untapped. It is instructive to ask why.
We think the core cause may be that, despite its cognitive ambitions,
connectionist AI suffers from a certain implicit behaviourism in its attitude towards
learning (see also Balkenius 1994). Many research efforts are focused on developing
generally applicable learning algorithms. This sounds great in theory. Surely
algorithms that can solve many problems are ‘‘better’’ than algorithms that can solve
only one. Error back-propagation and reinforcement learning algorithms are the big
deal they are exactly because they can solve vast ranges of problems. However,
generality also implies that the specific contingencies of a particular problem cannot
be exploited in solving it. This means that a general algorithm is necessarily sub-
optimal with respect to almost all problems, and that it will fail to capture what nifty
6 We can of course extend this observation to higher orders of learning. Whenever there is selection on
speedy second order learning, there is selection on third order learning, too. How important orders above
the second are is an open question (though we suspect that increasingly higher orders rapidly drop off in
evolutionary impact and explanatory importance).
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cognitive machinery may do the exploiting (learning bias and mental representation
included). It might seem that one cannot have it both ways. However, at least in
principle, one actually can avoid both the need to hand-craft specific algorithms and
the inherent sub-optimality of general algorithms. Namely, by letting a general
algorithm do one of the few things you actually need generality for: making specific
algorithms. This is exactly what evolution does when it makes learning abilities, but
somehow this fact remains sorely underlit in the field (for notable exceptions see
Chalmers et al. (1990), Nolfi et al.(1994), Nolfi and Parisi (1996), Oiko et al. (2005),
and the neuromodulation work of Soltoggio et al. (2007, 2008) that our own models
borrow from). Instead, evolution and learning are usually heaped together as
different ways of doing the same thing (adaptation) and combining the two is
viewed as double the hassle with little to gain. If connectionism is to shed light on
learning (and, if we are correct, representation) as it occurs in nature, then it should
view learning ability as not just subject but also object of adaptation.7
Conclusions
We discussed how correspondence between a cognitive system and its environment
may evolve as a result of selection for learning ability, and how mechanisms for
acquisition of correspondence may evolve as a result of selection for second order
learning. In both cases, correspondence is the result of the same interaction pattern
between adaptation processes (an interaction pattern also seen in evolution of
evolvability). Exactly how far these effects go in explaining the representational
features of advanced cognition in nature is an open question. Maybe these are just
two among many correspondence-producing effects at work in nature, and maybe
they are minor in comparison to others. But if anything, we hope to have shown that
it is a cogent and productive to ask how environments select for representational
cognition, and that in doing so we can make the evolution of representation
amenable to computational study.
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7 Traces of such a view of learning have emerged in the field of Artificial Life. Here interaction between
evolution and learning has become a topic of much research since Hinton and Nowlan (1987) first
demonstrated the Baldwin effect in a computational model. The focus is almost invariably on the effect
learning has on evolution, but specialized forms of learning can easily emerge during the genetic
assimilation phase of the Baldwin effect. If the phenotype has multiple loci that can be modified by
learning, and these loci have their degrees of plasticity defined independently in the genotype, then
genetic assimilation proceeds by lowering the plasticity of individual loci as plasticity on those loci
becomes unnecessary. This leads to adaptively non-uniform plasticity distribution in the phenotype,
which is expressed as advantageous learning bias. Especially if the optimal solution involves a limited but
non-zero amount of plasticity, evolution of highly specialized forms of learning can be observed (see e.g.
Suzuki and Arita 2004; Arnold et al. 2010).
Selection for Representation in Higher-Order Adaptation 93
123
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
References
Arnold, S. F., Suzuki, R., & Arita, T. (2010). Evolving learning ability in cyclically dynamic
environments: The structuring force of environmental heterogeneity (abstract). Proceedings of the
twelfth international conference on the simulation and synthesis of living systems (pp. 435–436).
Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
Arnold, S. F., Suzuki, R., & Arita, T. (2012). Second order learning and the evolution of mental
representation. Proceedings of the thirteenth international conference on the simulation and
synthesis of living systems (pp. 301–308). Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
Arnold, S. F., Suzuki, R., & Arita, T. (2013). Selection for reinforcement-free learning ability as an
organizing factor in the evolution of cognition. Advances in Artificial Intelligence, 2013,13. doi:10.
1155/2013/841646.
Arnold, S. F., Suzuki, R., & Arita, T. (2014). Using second order learning to evolve social representation
(Theory of mind). Proceedings of the 8th international conference on bio-inspired information and
communications technologies.
Balkenius, C. (1994). Biological learning and artificial intelligence. Paris: Lund University Cognitive
Studies.
Brooks, R. A. (1991). Intelligence without representation. Artificial Intelligence, 47(139–160), 1991.
Chalmers, D. J., Touretzky, D. S., Elman, J. L., & Hinton, G. E. (1990). The evolution of learning: An
experiment in genetic connectionism. Proceedings of the 1990 Connectionist Models Summer
School (pp. 81–90). Morgan Kaufmann.
Crombach, A., & Hogeweg, P. (2008). Evolution of evolvability in gene regulatory networks. PLoS
Computational Biology, 4(7), e1000112. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000112.
Fodor, J., & McLaughlin, B. (1990). Connectionism and the problem of systematicity: Why Smolensky’s
solution doesn’t work. Cognition, 35, 183–204.
Fodor, J., & Pylyshyn, Z. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis.
Cognition, 28, 3–71.
Garcia, J., Ervin, F. R., & Koelling, R. A. (1966). Learning with prolonged delay of reinforcement.
Psychonomic Science, 5(3), 121–122.
Gerard, P., Meyer, J. A., & Sigaud, O. (2005). Combining latent learning with dynamic programming in
the modular anticipatory classifier system. European Journal of Operational Research, 160(3),
614–637.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (1996). Complexity and the function of mind in nature. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2002). Environmental complexity and the evolution of cognition. In R. Sternberg & J.
Kaufman (Eds.), The evolution of intelligence (pp. 233–249). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Goldberg, D. E. (1989). Genetic algorithms in search, optimization and machine learning. Boston, MA:
Addison-Wesley Longman.
Gould, J. L., & Grant Gould, C. (1994). The animal mind. New York: Scientific American Library.
Harlow, H. F. (1949). The formation of learning sets. Psychological Review, 56, 51–65.
Hinton, G. E., & Nowlan, S. J. (1987). How learning can guide evolution. Complex Systems, 1, 495–502.
McLaughlin, B. P. (2009). Systematicity redux. Synthese, 170, 251–274.
Nolfi, S., & Parisi, D. (1996). Learning to adapt to changing environments in evolving neural networks.
Adaptive Behavior, 5(1), 75–97. doi:10.1177/105971239600500104.
Nolfi, S., Parisi, D., & Elman, J. L. (1994). Learning and evolution in neural networks. Adaptive
Behavior, 3(1), 5–28. doi:10.1177/105971239400300102.
Oiko, T., Suzuki, R., & Arita, T. (2005). Evolution of dynamic role differentiation based on phenotypic
plasticity in multi agent system. Proceedings of the computational science symposium (pp.
201–208).
94 S. Arnold et al.
123
Soltoggio, A., Bullinaria, J. A., Mattiussi, C., Durr, P., & Floreano, D. (2008). Evolutionary advantages of
neuromodulated plasticity in dynamic, reward-based Scenarios. Proceedings of the eleventh
international conference on the simulation and synthesis of living systems (pp. 569–576).
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Soltoggio, A., Durr, P., Mattiussi, C., & Floreano, D. (2007). Evolving neuromodulatory topologies for
reinforcement learning-like problems. Proceedings of the IEEE congress on evolutionary
computation (pp. 2471–2478). doi:10.1109/CEC.2007.4424781.
Spencer, H. (1885). The principles of psychology (3rd ed.). New York: Appleton.
Suzuki, R., & Arita, T. (2004). Interactions between learning and evolution: The outstanding strategy
generated by the Baldwin effect. Biosystems, 77, 57–71.
Tolman, E. C., & Honzik, C. H. (1930). ‘‘Insight’’ in rats. University of California Publications in
Psychology, 4, 215–232.
Voicu, H., & Schmajuk, N. (2002). Latent learning, shortcuts and detours: A computational model.
Behavioural Processes, 59, 67–86. doi:10.1016/S0376-6357(02)00060-8.
Selection for Representation in Higher-Order Adaptation 95
123
